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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintili /Appellee, : Case No. 940390-CA 
v. : 
LAURA RUTH MILLER, : Priority No, 2 
Defend a nt ' Appe11an L, i 
BRIEF -. AiP£: LEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE „b PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for unlawful 
production of a controlled substance (marijuana) - ; : 7 degree 
felony, in violation of utdii t «nie Ann K nn r/ • 8 ) va; \±} (1994); 
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), =a ^l^ pcs p 
misdemeanor , in violation of Utah Code Ann , § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) 
1994; and possession of paraphernal 1 a ,n r:Iass R misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-37a-5 (1994) . 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 ?^  ff^  ). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1, mid t lie trial court correctly rule that under the 
totality of the circumstances the search warrant affidavit 
established probable cause for * ;;-- issuance of a search warrant. 
When a .search wa > - it ±t> challenged as having been 
issued without probable cause, the reviewing court ..*oes n 
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's determination ~£ 
probable cause; rathei
 ( i«> uphold the warrant, the reviewing 
court must simply conclude that the magistrate had a 
11
'substantial basis'" for determining that probable cause 
existed. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993) 
(quoting State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989)); State 
v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah App, 1988), cert, denied, 773 
P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). In conducting its examination, the 
reviewing court "should consider a search warrant affidavit 'in 
its entirety and in a common-sense fashion.'" Id.; Salt Lake 
City v. Truiillo, 854 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah App. 1993). In short, 
the reviewing court pays great deference to the magistrate's 
decision. Truiillo, 854 P.2d at 606 (citing Babbell, 770 P.2d at 
991) . 
2. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
motion for mistrial? 
"On appeal from a denial of a motion for mistrial based 
on prosecutorial misconduct, because the trial court is in the 
best position to determine an alleged error's impact on the 
proceedings, [the reviewing court] will not reverse the trial 
court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Hay, 859 
P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two drug related offenses 
under Utah Code Ann. § 5837-8(1 ) (1994) including: unlawful 
production of marijuana, a third degree felony and possession of 
marijuana, a class B misdemeanor Additionally, defendant was 
charged with possession • ' * - -•-^  a misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a- •*--* (R. 1) . 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress contraband seized 
during a warrant-supported seaicli of JIM l"«i»in*:' an<l surrounding 
property in alleged violation of the state and federal 
constitutions (R. 38). 
After conducting a suppression t.tairlnq -n Pphruan, 4, 
1994, the trial court denied defendant , motion (R. 
Thereafter , Ti Api I'I 26, 19!34, defendant was tried by a jury and 
convicted as charged \k 153-55). 
The trial court sentenced defendant tc zero to five 
yeais ami assessed fines and tees for the ui., - • degree felony 
conviction, and two six month terms for the -- .- •*=• • • 
convictions, all terms to run concurrently. The trial court then 
stayed defendant's- sentences at i placed her on a 36 month term of 
probation (R. 171-72). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On U':tolier 1, M'M, Deputy Bill Pierce of the San Juan 
County Sheriff's Department obtained a search wairant foi 
property belonging to Robert Schultz, including a mobile home, 
house, outbuild,. ~. Addendum A. 
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The affidavit set forth information obtained from a confidential 
informant implicating defendant, who was one of Schultz's 
caretakers, in the production and use of controlled substances 
(R. 50), see Addendum A. 
1. Personal Observations of Confidential Informant 
As set out in Deputy Pierce's affidavit, the 
confidential informant reported that defendant was using the 
Schultz property "to cultivate marijuana," and that "marijuana 
and other controlled substances [were] kept in the vehicles and 
buildings on the property" (R. 50), see Addendum A. The 
informant also reported that "he ha[d] observed controlled 
substances in possession of [defendant] over the last few months, 
. . . in the structures . . . and in the vehicles she has access 
to on the property." Id. Specifically, the confidential 
informant reported that he had observed defendant "and two 
unknown males from Moab," use "marijuana and 'crack' on the 
property over the last few months." Id. 
In support of his assertions, the informant provided 
photographs of the live marijuana plants. He also provided a 
detailed description of where on the property, the marijuana was 
being grown, "describ[ing] the position relative to the building 
and trees" on the property (R. 50), see Addendum A. 
2. Independent Police Corroboration and Verification 
Deputy Pierce stated that he found the information 
reliable because he had personally known the informant "for two 
4 
years" and had found him "to be a reliable and truthful 
individual" (R. 50), see Addendum A. 
Additionally, . • " "luitz property 
from a public access road and found that matched the 
description provided by the informant • see Addendum A. 
Specifically, the deputy was able to :'-;.-...^.-. oly verify where 
on the property the.marijuana was being cultivated, noting the 
"tal :.. in the vicinity as described by the informant and 
depicted :* .< photographs, Id. 
3* Seizure of Evidence 
Upon -.•:••- o * the search warrant, police seized one 
large marijuana plant a.: another metal pi ant container fi om the 
grounds surrounding defendant's house Additionally, police 
seizee : canisters containing marijuana, one from a 
vehicle . : the property and another from defendant's bedroom. 
Finally, . H ..co discovered a baggy of marijuana and two pipes in 
the livingroom/kitchen area of defendant's living quarters (R. 
48), see Addendum A. 
4• Motion to Suppress 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from 
her residence, broadly alleging that the search warrant affid* I 
contained material misrepresentations and omitted material 
information and tl i i is failed to adequately establish the 
confidential informant's reliability (R 3 8 (motion); K Hi, 4 3 
(supporting memorandum)) (copies are attached as Addendum B). 
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5. Denial of Motion to Suppress 
The trial court denied defendant's motion on March 9, 
1994 and made the following factual findings: 
1. The Court finds that the search was 
conducted pursuant to a warrant and that the 
[d]efendant has the burden of going forward 
and showing that the warrant was deficient. 
2. Having heard all of the witnesses in this 
case the Court finds that the information 
given to the [o]fficer . . . was: 
a. That the confidential informant lived at 
the residence immediately before the 
information was given. 
b. That the [o]fficer had in his possession 
pictures of what he believed to be 
[m]arijuana plants described as being located 
on the property. 
c. That the informant had been a caretaker 
of this property and was allowed to remain on 
the properties even after difficulties had 
arisen with other persons who had lived or 
been trusted there. 
d. That the description of the premises 
given by the informant was borne out through 
independent investigation by the [o]fficer. 
e. That the [o]fficer viewed the properties 
at the location where the informant had said 
the plants were being cultivated from a 
public access and verified that the 
description was similar to what had been 
expressed to him earlier. 
3. The Court finds that the seeming 
inconsistency in the search warrant with 
regard to the amount of time that the 
[o]fficer had known the confidential 
informant was apparently in error based upon 
testimony, but that this error was not 
reckless and was not material and did not 
change the sufficiency in the warrant. 
4. The Court finds that no other part of the 
warrant was reckless and that information 
6 
with regard to the confidential informant 
relationship to the people on the property 
and possible motive was not borne out by the 
evidence and was not of a substantial enough 
nature to change the sufficiency of the 
warrant and was not required to be expressed 
in the warrant to make the warrant 
sufficient, 
5. The Court finds that after these supposed 
incidents occurred which bias the 
confidential informant, that the owner of the 
property retained him as a care taker [sic] 
of the property. 
The Court further finds upon hearing the 
testimony of the owner of the property and 
the defendant that their testimony was not as 
reliable as evidence placed into the record 
by the [o]fficer. 
7. The Court finds that warrant [sic] was 
sufficient, that the information express[ed] 
in the warrant provided probable cause to 
believe that marijuana plants may have been 
cultivated on the property at the time in 
question. That this was sufficiently set 
forth by the warrant and that the warrant 
was sufficient. 
(R. 56-58) (a complete copy is attached as Addendum C). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Considering the t^ rialitv of • : • . . . 
Pierce's affidavit set forth a substantial basis of information 
from whiiMli the magistrate properly determined there was probable 
cause to search defendant's residence and sun ounding property. 
Specifically, the affidavit contained the personal observations 
of a confi dent a al informant who reported seeing defendant both 
use and cultivate controlled substances, The informant provided 
insider details and even took pictures of the marijuana being 
cultiv ated Using1 the i iIformant' s description of the property 
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and the photographs, the deputy was able to determine 
approximately where on the property the marijuana was being 
cultivated and to otherwise visually verify the informant's 
information. 
The trial court rejected defendant's allegations of 
reckless misrepresentation in the affidavit on the ground that 
the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause, even 
setting aside the "seeming inconsistency," regarding the precise 
length of time Deputy Pierce had known the informant. Moreover, 
the trial court found that defendant's allegations of material 
omissions in the affidavit were either unsubstantiated and/or 
irrelevant and therefore not necessary to be set forth therein. 
On appeal defendant has not properly challenged the court's 
findings as clearly erroneous. She has neither marshalled the 
evidence, nor shown how it is insufficient. This Court must 
therefore reject defendant's challenge and instead assume the 
correctness of the trial court's findings. State v. Larsen, 828 
P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App. 1992), cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1992), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant's allegation of prejudicial error concerning 
the prosecutor's inadvertent retention of a defense exhibit 
during jury deliberations must be rejected as invited error. 
Defendant was made aware of the problem prior to the trial 
court's taking of the jury verdict, yet defendant failed to bring 
the matter to the court's attention until after the jury was 
excused. The trial court expressly noted defendant's failure to 
8 
timely raise the issue and accordingly denied defendant's motion 
for mistrial. Defendant's handling of the matter lead the court 
into error and precluded the fashioning of a remedy for the 
alleged prejudice. Under this circumstance, the invited error 
doctrine prohibits defendant from taking advantage of the error 
on appeal. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
Notwithstanding, the trial court made an alternative 
finding that defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by the fact 
that her exhibit did not go to the jury room during 
deliberations. Once again, defendant has not properly challenged 
the trial court's findings as clearly erroneous. She has neither 
marshalled the evidence, nor shown how it is insufficient. 
Consequently, this Court must reject defendant's allegation of 
unfair prejudice and assume the correctness of the trial court's 
findings to the contrary. Larsen, 828 P.2d at 490. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS 
FOR THE MAGISTRATE'S PROBABLE CAUSE 
DETERMINATION 
In Points I-II of her brief, defendant challenges the 
adequacy of the search warrant affidavit to establish the 
reliability of the confidential informant's allegations against 
her. Br. of App. at 12-20. In particular, defendant asserts 
that there was inadequate corroboration of the informant's 
statements, and that alleged material omissions and 
misrepresentations concerning the informant were reckless and 
9 
defeated the magistrate's determination of probable cause. Id. 
Defendant's allegations are not supported by a review of the 
affidavit and the trial court's findings below. 
A. Informant Reliability 
An informant's veracity, reliability and basis of 
knowledge are factors to be considered in determining whether, 
under the totality pf the circumstances, probable cause exists. 
State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992). However, 
11
 [t] hey are not strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly 
extracted' in every case." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 
(1983)). Rather, their significance varies under the 
circumstances of each case. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 (citing 
State v. Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984)). For example, 
"if the circumstances as a whole demonstrate the truthfulness of 
the informant's report, a less strong showing is required." 
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. 
In the present case, defendant complains that police 
had not previously used the informant and broadly asserts that 
the affidavit fails to set forth any significant corroboration of 
the informant's allegations. Br. of App. at 16, 19-20. While 
indicating that an informant has previously provided truthful 
information is an accepted method for establishing veracity, 
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985), it is not the 
X0 
only way.1 Indeed, " [c]ourts have also consistently approved 
the issuance of search warrants where the informant's knowledge 
is based on personal observation." Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. 
Additionally, this court has recognized that a search warrant is 
properly issued when the informant's reliability is demonstrated 
by the detail of his/her report, and/or by "independent 
corroboration of the significant facts." Id. 
Applying the foregoing standards and considering the 
totality of the circumstances, Deputy Pierce's affidavit is 
adequate to establish the reliability of the confidential 
informant in this case. 
1. Personal Observation 
First, the informant's allegations were based on his 
personal observations, which, as noted above, suggests that the 
information given was reliable. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. The 
informant reported that he had "observed controlled substances in 
possession of [defendant] over the last few months, . . . in the 
structures . . ., and in the vehicles she has access to on the 
property" (R. 50), see Addendum A. Further, the informant 
reported that he had seen defendant and two men from Moab, Utah, 
"use marijuana and %crack' on the property" (R. 50), see Addendum 
A. 
1
 See United v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 581-582 (1971) 
(upholding search warrant affidavit based on information gleaned 
from a first time informant; "this Court [has] never suggested 
that an averment of previous reliability was necessary"). Accord 
State v. Germane 559 A.2d 1031, 1035 (R.I. 1989); Meiia v. 
State, 761 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Tex. App. 1988); State v. Pavne, 271 
N.W.2d 350, 351 (Neb. 1978). 
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2• Insider Details 
Second, the reliability of the informant is enhanced by 
the insider nature of his information. Gates, 462 U.S. at 245; 
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. Specifically, the informant's 
statements describing the "structures" and "vehicles" on the 
property, as well as his description of the "tall grass" grown in 
proximity to the marijuana plants, suggests that the information 
was obtained from someone who was both familiar with and welcome 
on the Schultz property. Most significant is the fact that the 
informant provided the deputy with actual pictures of the 
marijuana plants that defendant was cultivating. 
3• Independent Corroboration 
Third, the deputy was able to independently verify the 
informant's description of the Schultz property. State v. Vigh, 
871 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Utah App. 1994); Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. 
Viewing the property from a public access road, and aided by the 
informant's photographs of the marijuana plants and his 
description of the property, the deputy was able to identify the 
"tall grass" near where the marijuana was grown. 
4. Nothing Given in Exchange for Information 
Finally, the informant received nothing in exchange for 
his information. As recognized by this Court, when a 
confidential informant receives nothing in exchange for his/her 
information, the magistrate properly assumes the information is 
reliable. Vigh, 871 P.2d at 1034. C|L Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 
("reliability and veracity are generally assumed when the 
12 
informant is a citizen who receives nothing from the police in 
exchange for the information"). 
B. Trial Court Found No Reckless Error And 
No Material Omission 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant broadly 
asserts that the affidavit fails to establish probable cause 
because the deputy omitted certain alleged information about the 
informant, including his motive, reputation, and potentiality as 
a suspect in the case. See Br. of App. at 16-17. Defendant 
further asserts that the affidavit recklessly misrepresented the 
length of time Deputy Pierce had known the informant and the 
informant's reliability. Id. Defendant's assertions are 
contrary to the trial court's written findings and are also 
improperly before the Court. 
1. Proceedings Below 
Deputy Pierce was called as a defense witness during 
the suppression hearing and was subjected to extensive 
examination by defense counsel (Transcript of Suppression 
Hearing, February 4, 1994, Tr. at 3-62) .2 Specifically, defense 
counsel asked the deputy how long he had known the informant 
prior to compiling the affidavit. Deputy Pierce clarified that 
he believed he had known the informant for two years, but that he 
did not remember when they first met (Tr. 17-18). The deputy 
recalled only that the informant had worked for him briefly as a 
2
 The transcript has not been stamped with record page 
numbers; therefore, citation to the transcript will be to the 
internal page numbers. 
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caretaker in January 1993, and that he had known him for an 
unspecified period of time prior, at least "parts of two years" 
(Tr. 18-19, 50-51). 
Defense counsel also queried Deputy Pierce concerning 
the informant's possible motive and reputation in the community 
(Tr. 24-33, 56-62). Deputy Pierce clarified that there were no 
criminal charges pending against the informant, nor did he have a 
criminal record (Tr. 24-26, 29) . Further, the informant had 
neither requested nor been offered a reward in the case (Tr. 33). 
And, while the deputy was aware that defendant and other people 
connected to the Schultz property had expressed reservations 
about the informant,3 their concerns did not suggest to him that 
the informant had fabricated the information about defendant (Tr. 
46-47). 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court characterized 
the issue concerning the precise length of time the deputy had 
known the informant as a "seeming inconsistency," and found that 
the two year length of time in the affidavit was "apparently in 
error . . . , but that [the] error was not reckless and was not 
material and did not change the sufficiency in the warrant" (R. 
57), see Addendum C. As for defendant's contentions regarding 
3
 The confidential informant's identity was known by the 
time of the suppression hearing and was apparently initially 
revealed at the preliminary hearing (R. 35). 
14 
the alleged omission of material information, the trial court 
found 
that no other part of the warrant was 
reckless and that information with regard to 
the confidential informant relationship to 
the people on the property and possible 
motive was not borne out by the evidence and 
was not of a substantial enough nature to 
change the sufficiency of the warrant and was 
not required to be expressed in the warrant 
to make the warrant sufficient. 
(R. 57) , see Addendum C. The trial court further found that the 
deputy's testimony concerning these matters was more credible 
than that of defendant and Steve Schultz, the owner of the 
property (R. 58) , see Addendum C.4 
2. Failure to Marshal 
Defendant has not challenged the foregoing findings as 
clearly erroneous. State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 
1990). Specifically, defendant has neither marshalled the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings, nor 
demonstrated how it is insufficient. Id.; State v. Drobel. 815 
P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App.) ("An appellant raising issues of fact 
on appeal must, under Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a), marshal all the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and then show 
that evidence to be insufficient."), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1991). Accordingly, this Court must reject defendant's 
allegation that the affidavit contained reckless 
4
 It is not clear from record whether defendant and 
Schultz in fact testified at the suppression hearing; however, 
affidavits from both defendant and Schultz are included in the 
record on appeal (R. 31-37). 
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misrepresentations and/or omitted material information and must 
instead assume the correctness of the trial court's findings to 
the contrary. State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App.), 
cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355 
(Utah 1993) . 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATION OF ERROR CONCERNING 
THE PROSECUTOR'S INADVERTENT POSSESSION OF A 
DEFENSE EXHIBIT DURING JURY DELIBERATIONS 
CONSTITUTES INVITED ERROR AND SHOULD BE 
REJECTED ON THAT GROUND 
In Point III of her brief, defendant complains about 
the prosecutor's inadvertent possession of a defense exhibit 
during jury deliberations. Br, of App. at 20-25. Because the 
error was brought to defense counsel's attention prior to the 
jury's excusal, his failure to timely request an appropriate 
remedy from the trial court constitutes invited error. State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991). 
A. Trial Court's Express Waiver Findings 
Following the jury verdict in this matter, defense 
counsel requested to make a motion outside the presence of the 
jury (Tr. 232) (pertinent transcript pages are attached as 
Addendum D). Once the jury had been excused, defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial, alleging that a "key" defense exhibit did 
not go into the jury (Tr. 234), see Addendum D. The prosecutor 
explained to the trial court that he had inadvertently put 
16 
Defense Exhibit #15 with his "stuff" and that it " [did not] go 
in the jury room" (Tr. 233) , see Addendum D. However, the 
prosecutor further informed the court that he brought the matter 
to defense counsel's attention, "jusi as the jury was coming in." 
Id. Defense counsel agreed that the misplaced exhibit had been 
shown to him "before the jury came back in[,]" and that he was 
"sure" the prosecutor's action was "inadverten[t]" (Tr. 234), see 
Addendum D. 
In ruling on the motion, the trial court inquired why 
neither party had brought the matter to his attention before he 
asked for the jury verdict: 
I could have sent that in with them and said 
you didn't have the exhibits. Here, here's 
an additional exhibit. We won't take your 
verdict. You consider whether that affects 
your verdict and then come back in. . . . 
This is something that could easily have been 
corrected simply by sending the jury back out 
with that exhibit and there would have been 
no question. I would not take their verdict 
from them until they had considered whether 
that would make a difference. 
(R. 235), see Addendum D. The Court then denied defendant's 
motion on waiver grounds: 
I find that the [d]efendant has not raised this in 
timely fashion. She knew about it, admittedly shortly 
before the verdict was received[,] but she knew about 
it in time that this could have been raised in time to 
correct it by sending the jury back before the verdict 
was received. 
5
 Defense Exhibit #1 is an unsigned letter from the 
confidential informant to the San Juan County Sheriff's 
Department and was admitted into evidence (R. 152). Although a 
copy of the exhibit is attached to defendant's brief as "Exhibit 
3;" defendant has not requested that the original be made part of 
the record on appeal. 
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I do find that the [d]efendant was aware but 
before [sic] the jury was brought into the 
courtroom and certainly before the Court 
received the verdict and had it read. 
Certainly not before the jury had indicated 
that they had reached a decision. But I can 
send them back before they have announced the 
decision and any fact, even afterwards I can 
send them back saying, wait a minute, I think 
there is something here that is a problem. I 
think I could send them back even then to 
reconsider their verdict in the light of 
additional information. 
(Tr. 236-37), see addendum D. 
B. Invited Error 
Utah's appellate courts recognize the "invited error" 
doctrine. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220; Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205. The 
doctrine has two principal purposes: to fortify the "long-
established policy that the trial court should have the first 
opportunity to address the claim of error [,]" and to 
"discourage [] parties from intentionally misleading the trial 
court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220. Defendant's allegation of unfair 
prejudice in this Court should be rejected as constituting 
invited error. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989) 
("invited error [] is procedurally unjustified and viewed with 
disfavor" (citing State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 
1987)). As demonstrated supra, Part A, defendant knew that 
Defense Exhibit #1 had not made it into the jury room prior to 
the jury verdict. Nevertheless, defense counsel waited until 
after the jury verdict was rendered to move for a mistrial; 
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thereby precluding the trial court an opportunity to fashion an 
appropriate remedy. Under this circumstance, any error was 
invited by defendant's failure to timely raise the issue and 
defendant should not be allowed to benefit from the error on 
appeal. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220 ("a party cannot take advantage 
of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial 
court into committing the error"). Indeed, had defendant taken 
the trouble to see that her defense exhibits were give to the 
jury, this issue would not have arisen. Consequently, defendant 
"must bear some of the responsibility for the oversight." State 
v. Buckley, 546 A. 2d 798, 799 (Vt. 1988) .6 It necessarily 
follows that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for 
mistrial on the above stated grounds did not constitute an abuse 
of its considerable discretion. State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 
(Utah 1993) . 
C. Failure to Marshal 
Notwithstanding its waiver ruling, the trial court 
alternatively ruled that defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by 
the fact that Defense Exhibit #1 was not made available to the 
jury during its deliberations: 
[I]t's my judgment that having listened to 
the evidence during the trial and the 
arguments of the parties [,] that the contents 
of Exhibit 1 were adequately and repeatedly 
described to the jury and that there was 
6
 Defendant has not argued that his trial counsel (who is 
also appellate counsel) was ineffective in failing to timely 
bring the issue to the court's attention; thus, neither the State 
nor the Court need engage in that analysis. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1220 n.19. 
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really no dispute about what Exhibit 1 said. 
And therefore, I certainly would have 
preferred to have the jury have it there in 
the event they wanted to look at it but they 
did not ask where it was which indicated they 
did not, at least I think it's reasonable to 
believe that they did not consider it a 
disputed question what Exhibit 1 said. It 
was something that had admittedly been 
argued, certainly been argued by the 
defendant extensively but that meant that the 
jury was very much aware of that exhibit and 
so I don't find that there is prejudice to 
the [d]efendant in the fact that Exhibit 1 
was not given to the jury to review. So the 
motion for mistrial is denied. 
(Tr. 237-38), see Addendum D. 
Defendant has not challenged the foregoing findings as 
clearly erroneous. State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 
1990). He has neither marshalled the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings, nor demonstrated how it is insufficient. 
Id.: State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App.) ("An 
appellant raising issues of fact on appeal must, under Utah 
R.Civ.P. 52(a), marshal all the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings, and then show that evidence to be 
insufficient."), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). 
Accordingly, this Court must reject defendant's allegation of 
unfair prejudice and must instead assume the correctness of the 
trial court's findings to the contrary. State v. Larsen, 828 
P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). 
20 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should uphold the 
denial of defendant's motions to suppress and for mistrial, and 
should also affirm defendant's narcotic related convictions. 
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IN THE JUSTICE COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. *fAf- #0^/ 
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me 
by Williar. Pierce, I am satisfied that there is a probable cause to 
believe that on the premises of 
The mobile home and house, outbuildings, vehicles, located on 
the following described property. (Copy of Warranty Deed also 
attached,) 
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft S 0 deg. 16' W and 417.42 ft S 86 deg. 
53'W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M, and running 
thence S 0 deg. 161 W 208.71 ft, thence S 86 deg. 531 W 208.71 ft, 
thence N 0 deg. 16' W. 208.71 ft, thence N 86 deg. 53' E 208.71 ft 
to the pob. 
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft. S 0 deg. 16' W and 626.13 ft. S. 86 
deg 53' W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M., and 
running thence S. 0 deg 16f W 208.71 ft., thence N. 86 deg. 53* E. 
208.71 ft. to the pob. 
More commonly known as the Steven Richard Schultz residence. 
Or in the vehicle(s) described as 
Black two tone Chev. Pickup, unknown Missouri plates, 
and Light blue 1985 Ford pickup, Utah lie. No. 925ZBE 
and a blue and white 1976 Ford Pickup, Lie No. 8437 CV 
In the County of San Juan, State of Utah, there is now being 
possessed or concealed certain property or evidence described as: 
Cultivation of Marijuana and other possession of other 
controlled substances, and that said property or evidence which 
consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conducts 
You are therefore commanded: at any time day or night. 
PAGE TWO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
to make a search of the above-named or described premises, and/or 
vehicle(s), on the herein-above described property or evidence and 
if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith 
before me at the Justice Court, County of San Juan, State of Utah, 
or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of 
this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this 1st day of October, 1993 
^ JU&SE Harold G.'Muhlestein 
Justice Court 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT '.JAJ-
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
4
 s s 
County of SAN JUAN ) # 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: Justice Court Judge Muhlestein, Monticello, Utah 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
William Pierce 
That he has reason to believe that on the premises of : 
The mobile home and house, outbuildings, vehicles, located on 
the following described property. (Copy of Warranty Deed also 
attached.) 
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft S 0 deg. 16f W and 417.42 ft S 86 deg. 
53'W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M, and running 
thence S 0 deg. 16' W 208.71 ft, thence S 86 deg. 53' W 208.71 ft, 
thence N 0 deg. 16' W 208.71 ft, thence N 86 deg. 53* E 208.71 ft 
to the pob» 
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft. S 0 deg. 16' W and 626.13 ft. S. 86 
deg 53' W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M., and 
running thence S. 0 deg 16' W 208.71 ft., thence N. 86 deg. 53' E. 
208.71 ft. to the pob. 
Commonly known as the Steven Robert Schultz property* 
and/or in the vehicle(s) described as: 
Black two tone Chev. Pickup, unknown Missouri plates, 
and Light blue 1985 Ford pickup, Utah lie. No. 925ZBE 
and a blue and white 1976 Ford Pickup, Lie No. 8437 CV 
In the San Juan County, State of Utah there is now certain property 
or evidence described as: 
Cultivation of Marijuana and other controlled substances, 
and that said property or evidence which consists of an item or 
constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to 
the illegal conduct; 
1 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of Cultivation of Marijuana and possession 
of controlled substances* 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Karrant 
are: 
Information obtained from confidential informant indicates that the 
property described is being used to cultivate marijuana* The 
confidential informant also indicates that marijuana and other 
controlled substances are kept in the vehicles and buildings on the 
property. Confidential informant states that he has observed 
controlled substances in possession of one Laura Miller over the 
last few months* in her possession, in the structures (there are 
out buildings, a house and mobile home on the property), and in the 
vehicles she has access to on the property. 
Confidential informant indicated he had viewed the use of marijuana 
and "crack" on the property over the last few months by Miller and 
two unknown males from Moab, Ut. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
confidential informant reliable because; 
Confidential informant is known to the requesting officer for two 
years and has known to be a reliable and truthful individual^. 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the 
confidential informant to be correct and accurate through the 
following independent investigation: 
The confidential informant indicated specific location on the 
property were the marijuana is being cultivated. He described the 
position relative to the building and trees. He provided 
photographs of the live marijuana plants. Through plain view of 
the property from a public access road the location can be seen and 
his description verified. Although only the tall grass can be seen 
as described and seen in the provided photographs. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items: 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior 
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or 





SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 1st day of October, 1993. 
/ / / 
4U: 
JUDGE I' 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT, 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
C/X 
Si 
Recorded *t Request «* S ° u t h Eastern Utah T i t l e Co. Jane 18 , 19&L 
by l £ L Dtp. Book_222_ P H - 2 7 8 R«f.-/3»000lfi2 
>I»iJ Ux notice to Stephen P. Schul t2 AAt>r*<* 600 Heidelberg Ln. Johnstown, PA 
lb905 
WARRANTY DEED 
•M CHARD L. SttlTH grantor 
of Beaver
 f County of Beaver • SUte of Utah, hci tby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
H& STEPHEN ROBERT SCKULTO 
grantee 
of 600 Heidelberg Ln, J o h n s t o n , PA 2E905 for the fjm of 
Ten and no/100 (510 .00 ) and other good and va luable c o n s i d e r a t i o n DOLLARS, 
the following described tracts of Und in San Juan County, 
State of l )Uh: 
5 .Beginning a t a p o i n t 32 .0 f t S 0 d e g . 26 ' W and 4 1 7 . 4 2 f t S 66 deg . 53* W of 
6 the Northeast corner of Sec 9, T295, Z24Z, SL&fcM, and rjr.nin$ thence S 0 deg. 
• 16' W 208.71 ft , thence S 86 deg. 531 W 206.71 ft , thence N 0 deg. 16' W 2C8.71 ft , 
£ thence N 86 deg. S3' L 208.71 ft to the point of beginning. 
deserving, however, frorr. the operation of this deed an undivided one half iL.) of 
all numeralsi oil and natural gas, together \.ith the right to rune arid x&c>e s&r.e 
without l iabil ity to the surface owner. 
ALSO 
©.Beginning at a point 32.0 ft, S 0°16' W and 626.13 ft. S 86°53* W of the 
5 Northeast corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLEiM., and running thence S. 0 16* W 
S 208.71 ft., thence S 66 S31 W 208.71 ft., thence N 0°16% E 208.71 ft., thence N. 
g 86 53' E. 206.71 ft. to the point of beginning. 
c 
Reserving However, from the Of^ration of this c^ed an undivided on half C;) of e l l 
irinerals, o i l , and natural ges, together with the right to mine and remove sara 
without l iabil ity to trie surface owner. 
WITNESS, the hind of said grantor .this 1?^h day of 
JUNE , A. D. 19 91 
Signed in the Presence of » / C w cfi <-&~uZ%) 
Richard L. Suth 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 / v Soum Cuttm utit> 
County of Beaver J ' (7^ Order NO j u f 2 ^ £ j £ k r 
On the 12th diyof June 
personally appeared before me Richard L. Srith 
the signer of the vithjn fos^rarr.ent, who duly *cV:n;w)*dged to 
[ V - l T X tt^i4l£ft| J ^ J N u U r y PwUic. 
My commission t»r?rt» y Ul * /g>f Residing i n P / z U V ^ (l^A.. 
»^A*K * >Ct—»*«»*»Tt £««»—£ OfcM PMNTlKO C O — »»V» V«»l CM* » 3 W 
ITEMS CONFICATEDS AS A RESULT OF THE SEARCH: 
ONE METAL CONTAINER USED AS A POT FOR MARIJUANA PLANT DISCOVERED 
OUTSIDE 
ONE LARGE LIVE MARIJUANA PLANT 
ONE FILM CONTAINER DISCOVERED IN THE 1985 FORD PICK-UP CONTAINING 
MARIJUANA 
ONE FILM CONTAINER DISCOVERED IN THE MASTER BEDROOM CONTAINING 
MARIJUANA 
ONE PIPE DISCOVERED IN THE LIVINGROOM/KITCHEN AREA 
ONE BAGGIE OF MARIJUANA DISCOVERED IN THE DESK IN THE LIVING ROOM 
CONTAINED ALSO TWO PIPES 
ADDENDUM B 
S£i J J ' W >-
RANDALL GAITHER #1141 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-1990 
FILED FEB " * 1994 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY, 
Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAURA RUTH MILLER 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Criminal No: 9317-273 
The Defendant, Laura Ruth Miller, hereby moves the Court to 
enter an Order suppressing the following: 
1. All information seized from the residence at P.O. Box 96, 
La Sal, Lzah 84530, based upon a search warrant issued by the 
Justice Court, San Juan County, State of Utah, on October 1, 1993. 
2. All statements made by the Defendant in custody pursuant 
to the warrant and prior to the Defendant's being advised rights 
pursuant to Miranda. 
3. This Motion is based upon the Memorandum and affidavits 
submitted with this Motion or to be submitted and upon Article I, 
Section 12, and Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and 
Amendments 4, 5, 6, and 14/£f the United States Constitution. 
DATED this . day of Janu&yV, 1994. 
2S 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS was mailed postage prepaid to: 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
P.O. Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
DATED this _<&£5 day of January, 1994. 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT '.JAJ' 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAB 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
* fi S 
County of SAN JUAN ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: Justice Court Judge Muhlestein, Monticello, Utah 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
William Pierce 
That he has reason to believe that on the premises of : 
The mobile home and house, outbuildings, vehicles, located on 
the following described property. (Copy of Warranty Deed also 
attached.) 
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft S 0 deg. 16f W and 417.42 ft S 86 deg. 
53'W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M, and running 
thence S 0 deg. 16' W 208.71 ft, thence S 86 deg. S31 W 208.71 ft, 
thence N 0 deg. 16' W 208.71 ft, thence N 86 deg. 53* E 208.71 ft 
to the pob. 
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft. S 0 deg. 16' W and 626.13 ft. S. 86 
deg 53 • W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLBSM., and 
running thence S. 0 deg 16f W 208.71 ft., thence N. 86 deg. 53' E. 
208.71 ft. to the pob. 
Commonly known as the Steven Robert Schultz property* 
and/or in the vehicle(s) described as: 
Black two tone Chev. Pickup, unknown Missouri plates, 
and Light blue 1985 Ford pickup, Utah lie. No. 925ZBE 
and a blue and white 1976 Ford Pickup, Lie No. 8437 CV 
In the San Juan County, State of Utah there is now certain property 
or evidence described as: 
Cultivation of Marijuana and other controlled substances, 
and that said property or evidence which consists of an item or 
constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to 
the illegal conduct; 
1 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of Cultivation of Marijuana and possession 
of controlled substances. 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant 
are: 
Information obtained from confidential informant indicates that the 
property described is being used to cultivate marijuana. The 
confidential informant also indicates that marijuana ancT other 
controlled substances are kept in the vehicles and buildings on the 
property. Confidential informant states that he has observed 
controlled substances in possession of one Laura Miller over the 
last few months, in her possession, in the structures (there are 
out buildings, a house and mobile home on the property), and in the 
vehicles she has access to on the property. 
Confidential informant indicated he had viewed the use of marijuana 
and "crack" on the property over the last few months by Miller and 
two unknown males from Moab, Ut. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
confidential informant reliable because: 
^ \ 
Confidential informant is known to the requesting officer for two 
years and has known to be a reliable and truthful individual. 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the 
confidential informant to be correct and accurate through the 
following independent investigation: 
The confidential informant indicated specific location on the 
property were the marijuana is being cultivated. He described the 
position relative to the building and trees. He provided 
photographs of the live marijuana plants. Through plain view of 
the property from a public access road the location can be seen and 
his description verified. Although only the tall grass can be seen 
as described and seen in the provided photographs. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items: 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior 
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or 





SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 1st day of October, 1993 
JUDGE V 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT, 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Si 
Recorded *t Request «t South Eastern Utah Title Co. June 18, 19£h ... ^ / * •' --' ' 
iljLill—. M . Fee Pa id f 7 - ^ n _ _ T f t n ' ^ r W » « - C A n ."Tr^n P r in»y C ^ r / ^ f 
by i c i _ Dep. Book_212_ *H" 278
 M.. J2' Q D Q l £ 2 
Mail tax notice <Q Stephen P. Schultz Arif?r**« 600 Heidelberg Ln. Johnstown, PA 
15905 
WARRANTY DEED 
•RICHARD L. SttlTO grantor 
cf Denver , County of Beaver , Statt of Utah, hci eby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
& 
•STEPHEN ROBERT SCKULTZ 
grantee 
of 600 Heidelberg Ln. J o h n s t o n , PA 1S905 for the f j n of 
Ten and no/100 (510 .00) and other ^co i and va luable c o n s i d e r a t i o n DOLLARS, 
the following described tracts of land in San Juan County, 
State of Utah: 
g *B&iinnin<4 a t a pa in t 32 .0 f t S 0 dec*. 16* w and 417 .42 f t S 66 deo . 5 3 ' W of 
C the Northeast corner of Sec 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M, and rjnning thence S 0 d e y . 
« 16* W 208.71 f t , thence S 86 deg . S>2' W 208.71 f t , thence N 0 deg . 16 ' W 2U.ll f t , 
£ thence K 86 c e g . 53 ' L 208.71 f t t o the point of b e g i n n i n g . 
Reserving, however, frorr. the operat ion of t h i s deed an undivided one ha l f (h) of 
a l l f u n e r a l s , Oil and r.ctural u s , toge ther \ . i th the r i ^ h t t o rune arid it£ic*e aar.e 
withojt l i a b i l i t y to the surface owner. 
ALSO 
©.Beginning at a point 32.0 f t . S 0°16' W and 626.13 f t . S B6°53' W of the 
5 Northeast corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLSiM., and running thence S. 0 16' W 
* 208.71 f t . , thence S S6053 l W 208.71 f t . , thence N O 0 ^ 1 E 206.71 f t . , thence N. 
£ 86 53' E. 206.71 f t . to the point of beginning. 
Reserving However, frcrr, the o^rat ion of this c^ed an undivided on half (h) of a l l 
irjnerals, o i l , &rd natural gas, together with the right t o rune and remove sa,-ne 
withojt l i a b i l i t y to the surface owner. 
WITNESS, the hand of aaid grantor , this 1 ? l h day of 
JUNE , A . D. 19 91 
Signed in the Presence of I &£~* <* *&~uZ% 
Richard L. S*uth 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 / v Soui* tastem uian 
I ^ £ T»Ut Company 
Couctyof Beaver J (7* o>g»r NO
 m\*//S£ ^ ^ 
Oc the 32th day of Jjne • A. D. 19 91 
personally appeared before mt Richard L. S r i t h 
the signer. of the vithjn fosj.rjjjrnent, who d\ily ackn:*)tdged to rne that he executed the 
same. ,<r* 
Q,,^ £&.*• 
>fy commission »*pi"« Sj'^> * ^ Residing ** ul/Atu* (l*h\ U 
U ] Notary Public. 
in - . *i 
ITEMS CONFICATEDS AS A RESULT OF THE SEARCH: 
ONE METAL CONTAINER USED AS A POT FOR MARIJUANA PLANT DISCOVERED 
OUTSIDE 
ONE LARGE LIVE MARIJUANA PLANT 
ONE FILM CONTAINER DISCOVERED IN THE 1985 FORD PICK-UP CONTAINING 
MARIJUANA 
ONE FILM CONTAINER DISCOVERED IN THE MASTER BEDROOM CONTAINING 
MARIJUANA 
ONE PIPE DISCOVERED IN THE LIVINGROOM/KITCHEN AREA 
ONE BAGGIE OF MARIJUANA DISCOVERED IN THE DESK IN THE LIVING ROOM 
CONTAINED ALSO TWO PIPES 
RANDALL GAITHER #1141 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-1990 
Sai ^  **• C: Ay 
F.L2D f£% - if 199^ 
CtERK OF THE COURT 
BY. 
Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
LAURA RUTH MILLER 
Defendant. 
I MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
I Criminal No: 9317-273 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Attached hereto is a copy an the SEARCH WARRANT served on 
October 1, 1993. 
2. Attached hereto is a copy of The AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH 
WARRANT which is the basis for the issuance of the warrant. 
3. As a result of the search pursuant to the warrant issued 
on the basis of the AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT, all of the 
controlled substances to be introduced in evidence at trial. 
POINT X 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT WAS 
ISSUED WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE IN LIGHT OF THE 
MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION OF FACTS AND THE 
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE IATERIAL FACTS TO THE 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE ISSUING THE WARRANT. 
In Franks vs. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154 (1978) the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant can be challenged based 
upon misstatements in the search warrant when the misstatements are 
recklessly made or knowingly false information. That information 
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must be deleted under Franks in reviewing the sufficiency of the 
affidavit. If the statements are necessary to a finding of 
probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits 
thereof suppressed. 
The test to determine whether any misrepresentation or false 
statements contained in an affidavit is material to establishment 
of probable cause and is based upon an objection determination as 
to whether the warrant would have been issued if the magistrate has 
been given accurate information. United States vs. Page, 808 F.2d 
723, cert. den. 482 U.S. 918 (10th Cir. 1987). In Page, the Tenth 
Circuit Court indicated even if non-intentional errors are 
material, the errors should be considered or false statements under 
the "totality of the circumstance" standard and not considered as 
to probable cause. The Court said a magistrate issuing a warrant 
must first make a practical, common sense decision as to whether 
there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found 
in a particular place. Whether the affidavit involves hearsay 
conclusion or a expert, a magistrate would not have a substantial 
basis for concluding [ing] that probable cause existed if the expert 
affidavit was based on material errors. Gates, supra 212-14 citing 
Jones v. United States. 362 US 257 (1060). The validity of a search 
warrant must be assessed on the basis of information that the 
agents had actually disclosed or has a duty to disclose to the 
issuing magistrate. Maryland v. Garrisonf 480 U.S. 79 (1987). 
In State v. Brown. 798 P 2d 284 (Utah 1990), the Utah Court of 
Appeals in relation to search warrants issued on hearsay 
information noted that the Courts view the testimony of citizen 
informers with less rigid scrutiny than the testimony of police 
informers, citing State v. Tredwav, 499 P. 2d, 846 (Utah, 1972). 
The Court stated that in cases not involving citizen informants 
that the two-pronged test of Aouilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 108 (1964) 
which requires circumstances which establish the basis of knowledge 
of the informant and the informant's veracity or reliability should 
be considered in determining whether there is probable cause for 
the Warrant. 
In Brown, the Court also discusses briefly the issue which is 
raised by the Appellants in this case concerning the knowingly, or 
with reckless inclusion of information which shows a disregard for 
the truth, including false and misleading information. The Court 
of Appeals cited the case of Franks v. Delaware, Supra, where the 
United States Supreme Court held that if a Defendant shows by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the affiant made a false 
statement, intentionally, knowingly or with reckless disregard for 
the truth, the false material must be set to one side and probable 
cause determined by the Affidavit's remaining content. 
In United States v. Boyce. 601 F. Supp. 947 (D.C.Min., 1985), 
the Court ruled that an Defendant is entitled to a evidentiary 
hearing to challenge the veracity of a search warrant affidavit if 
he makes a substantial preliminary showing of reckless disregard of 
the truth. Intentional or reckless omissions from search warrant 
affidavits were indicated to as equally serious as affirmative 
misrepresentations including information concerning the informant's 
status and other factors which would have been important to the 
magistrate to determine the issue of probable cause. 
At the Preliminary Hearing held in this case, the principal 
investigation Officer testified that the confidential informant not 
disclosed in the warrant was a person identified as Hans Guhr, a 
non-police officer and a person with pending criminal charges. He 
indicated that upon cross-examination that the 
POINT II 
THE AFFIDAVIT, ON IT'S FACE DOES NOT MEET THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIRED STANDARD FOR USE OF 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT INFORMATION. 
In the case of State v. Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court set 
forth the requirements a warrant must contain on it#s face 
concerning independent verification of information from 
confidential informant. The Court indicated the following the case 
of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S., 213 (1983), the warrant must 
establish a tight web of circumstantial evidence supporting the 
reliability of the allegations of the confidential informant. The 
Court indicated that depending on the circumstances, a showing of 
the basis of knowledge and veracity or reliability of the person 
providing the information for a warrant may well be necessary to 
establish that, with a fair probability, evidence sought actually 
exists and can be found where the informant claims. 
In State vs. Singleton, 214 Utah Adv. Rep 30 (1993) the Court 
of Appeals stated: 
Utah courts, however, have used the Aguilar-
Spinelli factors as guides in applying the 
totality-of-the-circumstances test. M[A]n 
informant's ^reliability' and %basis of 
knowledge'are but two relevant considerations, 
among other, in determining the existence of 
probable cause under *a totality-of-the 
circumstances.f%% Hansenf 732 P.2d at 130 
(citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 231-32,235-36, 103 
S. Ct. at 2328-31). See also State v. Puruse. 
828 P.2d 515-517. (Utah App. 1992). The 
Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines are not applied as 
"strict, independent requirements to be 
*rigidly exacted' in every case. A weakness 
in one or the other is not fatal to the 
warrant so long as in the totality there is 
substantial basis to find probable cause.'1 
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130 (citing Gates, 462 
U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332). 
In an analysis of the Search Warrant in this case indicates 
that the officer made misrepresentations concerning the important 
factor of corroboration of the confidential informant. The 
evidence will also indicate that the affiant to the search warrant 
failed to disclose relevant and important information concerning 
the unreliability of the informant such as benefits, compensation 
and other inducements given to have the confidential informant to 
give the information. The Defendant will present evidence that 
POINT III 
ANY STATEMENTS MAY BE EITHER DEFENDANT WHILE 
IN THE RESIDENCE MUST BE SUPPRESSED UNDER 
MIRANDA VS. ARIZONA 
In the case of State vs. Mircruet. 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Ct. 
App. 1992) the Utah Court of Appeals found that a defendant was in 
custody at the time that he was told to retrieve marijuana was 
entitled to Miranda protection. In that case, the Court went on to 
suppress the incriminating evidence. In that case, the Defendant 
was located in a Highway Patrol Officers vehicle when he was 
interrogated about the location of marijuana. 
The Court listed several factors to determine whether a person 
was in custody and those factors are as follows: 
1. The site of the interrogation. 
2. Whether the investigation focused on the Defendant, 
3. Whether the objection indicia of arrest were present. 
4. The length and form of interrogation. 
5. The person freely arrived at the place of interrogation. 
The Court in that case, suppressed the physical evidence of 
the marijuana found as a result of the Miranda violations and the 
Court indicated that a remedy for the Miranda violations would 
include the suppression of physical evidence. 
In the present matter, incriminating statement of the 
Defendant were made pending and during the time she was in custody 
pending the search warrant execution process. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendants submit that the evidence will be introduced at 
the hearing to justify suppression of an illegal search which took 
place under an invalid warrant. 
*M. DATED this // I day of January, 1994 
</sr 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IS SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS was mailed postage 
prepaid to: 
Craig c. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
P.O. Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
DATED this e-*Q day of January, 1994. 
ADDENDUM C 
SEVENTH DISTRICT CO J r 
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
San Juan County Attorney 
P. 0. Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Phone 587-2128 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH * 
Plaintiff, * FINDING OF FACT 
AND ORDER 
vs. 
LAURA MILLER, * Criminal No. 9317-273 
Defendant(s). * 
This matter came on before the Court on Defendants Motion to 
Suppress on the 4th day of February, 1994. Defendant was present 
and represented by counsel, Randall Gaither. The State was present 
and represented by Craig C. Halls. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the search was conducted pursuant to 
a warrant and that the Defendant has the burden of going forward 
and showing that the warrant was deficient. 
2. Having heard all of the witnesses in this case the Court 
finds that the information given to the Officer in this case was: 
a. That the confidential informant lived at the 
residence immediately before the information was given. 
b. That the Officer had in his possession pictures of 
what he believed to be Marijuana plants described as being 
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located on the property. 
c. That the informant had been a caretaker of this 
property and was allowed to remain on the properties even 
after difficulties had arisen with other persons who had 
lived or been trusted there. 
d. That the description of the premises given 
by the informant was borne out through independent 
investigation by the Officer. 
e. That the Officer viewed the properties at the 
location where the informant had said the plants were 
being cultivated from a public access and verified that 
the description was similar to what had been expressed to 
him earlier. 
3. The Court finds that the seeming inconsistency in the 
search warrant with regard to the amount of time that the Officer 
had known the confidential informant was apparently in error based 
upon the testimony, but that this error was not reckless and was 
not material and did not change the sufficiency in the warrant. 
4. The Court finds that no other part of the warrant was 
reckless and that information with regard to the confidential 
informant relationship to the people on the property and possible 
motive was not borne out by the evidence and was not of a 
substantial enough nature to change the sufficiency of the warrant 
and was not required to be expressed in the warrant to make the 
warrant sufficient. 
5. The Court finds that after these supposed incidents 
2 
occurred which bias the confidential informant, that the owner of 
the property retained him as a care taker of the property. 
6. The Court further finds upon hearing the testimony of the 
owner of the property and the defendant that their testimony was 
not as reliable as evidence placed into the record by the Officer. 
7. The Court finds that warrant was sufficient, that the 
information express in the warrant provided probable cause to 
believe that marijuana plants may have been cultivated on the 
property at the time in question. That this was sufficiently set 
forth by the warrant and that the warrant was sufficient. 
IT IS THEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress is hereby denied. 
DATED this 9lK day of March, 1994. 
Jucige Lyle R. Anderson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Randall Gaither, at 
321 South 600 E., S.L.C. Ut. 84102 this _££& day of March, 1994, 




thought I had got those all out. 
MR. HALLS: I went through all of those 
instructions, Your Honor, and the ones that I had given and 
told the Court that I thought they were in pretty shape and 
in going through all those and checking for spelling and all 
that kind of stuff, all the places it says "his" I didn't 
even think about it. 
THE COURT: I read through them and then when I 
get here in Court and Ifm reading them out loud all of a 
sudden all these typos jump out at me. It woulc* be nice if 
we could get all those, they're better than the last set 
anyway. 
The Court will be in recess pending the return of 
the jury. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: The record will show that the parties 
are here and the counsel are here and I guess the bailiff 
has informed us that the jury has reached a verdict. 
Let's see, Mr. Eardley, it looks like you are the 
fore person, at least you are the paper carrier. 
All right, to have the clerk read the verdicts. 
THE CLERK: The State of Utah versus Laura Ruth 
Miller, Defendant. We the jury duly impaneled and sworn in 
the above entitled case do find the Defendant, Laura Ruth 
Miller, guilty of unlawfully producing a controlled 
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substance. Dated this 26th day of April, a.d., 1994. 
Signed J. Terry Eardley, Foreperson. 
The State of Utah versus Laura Ruth Miller, Case 
No. 9317273. We the jury duly impaneled and sworn in the 
above entitled case do find the Defendant, Laura Ruth 
Miller, guilty of possession of a controlled substance. 
Dated this 26th day of April, a.d., 1994 and signed J. Terry 
Eardley, Foreperson. 
The State of Utah versus Laura Ruth Miller, Case 
No. 9317273. We the jury duly impaneled and sworn in the 
above entitled case do find the Defendant, Laura Ruth 
Miller, guilty of possession of paraphernalia. Dated this 
26th day of April, a.d., 1994. Signed J. Terry Eardley, 
Foreperson. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gaither, do you wish the jury 
polled? 
MR. GAITHER: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Members of the jury, I appreciate your 
service. I know that itfs been a sacrifice for you to be 
here for two days and that these kinds of decisions are 
difficult to make because you have to say to someone in 
effect I believe you committed a crime. And I don't think 
that's easy for any of us to do. I do want to thank you for 
your service. You maybe interested to know that Count 1 of 
which you convicted the Defendant is what we call a Third 
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1 Degree Felony. It's punishable by up to five years in 
2 I prison if I make a determination to send the Defendant to 
3 prison and/ of course, there's lots of other things I can 
4 do. I can put her on probation. I can require that she 
5 complete certain treatment programs successfully. I can 
6 require that she go and spend some time in jail, that she do 
7 J some sort of community service. Lots of options I have and 
8 there's a whole agency of State government devoted to 
9 supervising people on probation and recommending to Courts 
10 what they should do with someone that's convicted of an 
11 offense. So that's something that I can do. 
12 The other two offenses are Class B Misdemeanors 
13 and I could put the Defendant in jail for six months on each 
14 J one of those and there's also fines with each one of these 
15 that I can require the Defendant pay a fine. 
16 Now, counsel, I'd like to have a pre-sentence 
17 investigation report before I make a decision as to what the 
18 sentence should be. 
19 MR. GAITHER: Your Honor, I have a motion to make 
20 J outside the presence of the jury. 
21 THE COURT: We'll address that. 
22 Members of the jury, you now are free to talk to 
23 J anyone you want to about this case or not to talk to them. 
24 J It's certainly your decision if you don't want to talk about 
25 I this. You have no obligation to do that, but I now remove 
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any restrictions I may have placed on you with regard to 
this case. You can do what you want to about talking about 
it. 
Let's see, I'm trying to think if you have any 
other questions about what you can do. I think that about 
covers it. You are free to go now. If you haven't received 
your jury fee for the second day, make sure you stop and 
pick it up at the clerk's office. You don't have to leave 
but I am going to excuse you from the jury box so that 
you'll feel free to come in and out as you may chose. We 
have a few more things to address right now. So you're 
excused from the jury box. If you want to stay and watch 
what happens now, you're welcome to do that. 
And the note pads, we'll either take those, you 
can either take your notes with you and do what you want 
with them or leave them here and we'll destroy them. 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, I have a matter that I 
need to indicate. As I made my closing arguments I had this 
letter. It was placed on the desk. I put it in my stuff. 
It didn't go in the jury room. It's Exhibit 1. I think 
that's what the motion, I just as the jury was coming in 
showed it to Mr. Gaither. So I want the Court to know that 
that's— 
MR. GAITHER: Yes, Your Honor, at this time the 
Defendant would move the Court for a mistrial. The 
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prosecutor, he did show me before the jury came back in. In 
fact, he had, Ifm sure by inadvertence he had taken an 
exhibit that did not go into the jury which is Exhibit 1. I 
would point out that that was a key exhibit to the defense. 
I referred to that exhibit specifically. I asked the jury 
to read that exhibit. There was no other document that said 
that. As far as I was concerned in my closing argument, if 
my closing argument is reviewed that was the central basis 
to the defense is that Hans Guhr had started out making 
false statements and that he was suspect in the case and the 
information that he gave to the police was false and they 
did not have it and this is an exhibit that was not in the 
jury room and I believe that there's no way that the Court 
can find that that is not prejudicial. It's important to 
the defense. I understand it was inadvertence on the part 
of the prosecutor. I'm not saying he took it intentionally 
but on the other hand it's fundamental that all exhibits go 
into the jury and that they have all the exhibits before 
them, that they consider all of the exhibits. So I would 
move the Court for a mistrial setting aside the jury 
verdict. 
THE COURT: Mr. Halls? 
MR. HALLS: I appreciate Mr. Gaither's indication 
that he believe that that was inadvertent which it was. 
Your Honor, I think if there's an issue here, if there is 
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any difficulty here it was not central to the juryfs 
determination of what the verdict would have been whether 
they had that or didn't have it. It was adequately argued 
by all parties. It was to the jury in a couple of different 
ways by Mr. Gaither and parts of it by myself. If there is 
any error in that I believe itfs harmless error and if he 
wants to argue that to the Court of Appeals I believe that's 
the appropriate for that to be done. I don't think that on 
that basis that the thing should be a mistrial. 
THE COURT: Mr. Halls, when did you notice that 
you had that exhibit? 
MR. HALLS: As I walked in here and sat down. 
THE COURT: Why did neither one of you mention 
this to me before I asked for the jury verdict. I could 
have sent that in with them and said you didn't have the 
exhibits. Here, here's an additional exhibit. We won't 
take your verdict. You consider whether that affects your 
verdict and then come back in. Why didn't either of you ask 
me to do that? This is something that could easily have 
been corrected simply by sending the jury back out with that 
exhibit and there would have been no question. I would not 
take their verdict from them until they had considered 
whether that would make a difference. 
MR. GAITHER: Again, in response, this gets to the 
basis of a jury trial. They are supposed to have all of the 
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exhibits and all of the evidence and, again, this was key. 
This was the document that I said you need to take a look 
at. Please read and deliberate on this. And it wasn't in 
there before the jury. So they did not have all of the 
exhibits and I think that we would move the Court for a 
mistrial• 
THE COURT: All right. I find that the Defendant 
has not raised this in timely fashion. She knew about it, 
admittedly shortly before the verdict was received but she 
knew about it in time that this could have been raised in 
time to correct it by sending the jury back before the 
verdict was received. 
MR. GAITHER: This was done as the jury was 
walking in and--
MR. HALLS: No, it was done before the bailiff 
went out. Your Honor, I walked in and sat down here. I 
opened up my file and there was the document and I pulled it 
out and I said, ftOops.,f He shook his head and said, Oh. 
And it was before the Judge came in. In fact, it was before 
you walked in the room. 
MR. GAITHER: I don't believe that the Defendant 
or myself has an obligation to, this isn't a mistake that, I 
mean I didn't have the exhibit. Mr. Halls knew he had the 
exhibit. As the Court has indicated he could have said 
something to the Court. He didn't say anything to the 
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Court, As far as I'm concerned it was a mistrial at the 
time it went in there at the time of deliberation. It would 
have been error, after they have reached a verdict to send 
that back in. I was representing my client to the best of 
my abilities. I did not know of any requirement that said 
that I had to point out the fact that the prosecutor has an 
exhibit there to the Court. My client should not be held, I 
don't think that the Court can find a waiver in this 
situation based on those facts and circumstances. 
THE COURT: I do find that the Defendant was aware 
but before the jury was brought into the courtroom and 
certainly before the Court received the verdict and had it 
read. Certainly not before the jury had indicated that they 
had reached a decision. But I can send them back before 
they have announced the decision and any fact, even 
afterwards I can send them back saying, wait a minute, I 
think there is something here that is a problem. I think I 
could send them back even then to reconsider their verdict 
in the light of additional information. 
And even if that were not the case, it's my 
judgment that having listened to the evidence during the 
trial and the arguments of the parties that the contents of 
Exhibit 1 were adequately and repeatedly described to the 
jury and that there was really no dispute about what Exhibit 
1 said. And therefore, I certainly would have preferred to 
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1 I have the jury have it there in the event they wanted to look 
2 1 at it but they did not ask where it was which indicated they 
3 I did not, at least I think it's reasonable to believe that 
4 they did not consider it a disputed question what Exhibit 1 
5 said. It was something that had admittedly been argued, 
6 certainly been argued by the defendant extensively but that 
7 meant ti*at the jury was very much aware of that exhibit and 
8 I so I don't find that there is prejudice to the Defendant in 
9 the fact that Exhibit 1 was not given to the jury to review. 
10 I So the motion for mistrial is denied. 
















C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the transcript of the 
court audio tapes in the foregoing matter were 
transcribed by me, Carolyn Erickson, a Notary Public and 
Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of 
Utah, and Certified Court Transcriber, residing in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
The transcript is a full and complete 
transcription to the best of my ability of the 
proceedings which were requested to be transcribed. 
I further certify that I am not of kin or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said 
cause of action, and that I am not interested in the 
event thereof. 
Witness my hand at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
27th day of July, 1994. 
Carolyn fcrickson, CSR 
